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ABSTRACTS
Title of Research paper:

RESEARCH ON HEDGING
EFFICIENCY IN THE SSEFC
CONTAINER FORWARD MARKET

Degree:

M.Sc.

The motivation of this paper is to discuss the newly established SSEFC container
forward market in terms of hedging performance. Writer also wants to find the reasons
behind the different hedging outcomes.
The research paper starts with a proper discussion about the current container
shipping market. In order to deliver the idea of how vital role it has been playing,
several figures and charts are used to show the comparison between different shipping
segments. It reveals that container shipping market is risky and devices for hedging
such risks are needed.
Next, SSEFC container forward market is studied. Market history, function and
features are all mentioned. Characteristics of both spot and paper freight rates are the
main objects of discussion, such as trends, volatility and rates of return.
After the theory of optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency is introduced, OLS
and GARCH model is applied to dig up the optimal ratio. Comparisons of hedging
efficiency between different sailing routes of containerized forward products and
between containerized and bulk market is carried out.
Last but not least, writer is also keen on finding factors behind such dissimilar
performance, such as different volatility, trade pattern, degree of uncertainty and risk
and market players.

KEYWORS: SSEFC container forward contracts, Freight rates on EU route and
UW route, Optimal hedge ratio, Hedging efficiency, OLS, GARCH
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1.

Background

SSEFC container forward contracts are a new-born member of the derivatives family,
which can be used as risk-prevent tools for both shipping lines and shippers. The price
is largely influenced by the SCFI (Shanghai Containerized Freight index) according to
the specified route, amount and time. China has always been keen on having her own
shipping derivative products. Especially, when Shanghai was selected to be developed
as an international financial and shipping center by the State Council of China in 2009
(the same year that SCFI was launched), more and more attention was paid to the
shipping derivatives sectors. As a shipping derivative, its original value is carried out
by hedging the risk, i.e. the volatility of the freight market, not by speculating.
Therefore, a sufficient amount of players is required to stay and remain active within
the market. Unfortunately, it is what the market lacking most at present.
Before SCFI is launched by SSE (Shanghai Shipping Exchange) in 2009.10.16,
CCFI (China Containerized Freight Index) has already been operating since 1998.
However, due to its limitation and the strike of the financial crisis in 2008, CCFI is no
longer a suitable signal for the rapidly-changing container market. More importantly,
CCFI failed to cultivate a shipping derivative as reference data. The new index
version--SCFI has been upgraded in terms of routes, calculating rules, information
source to be qualified to be operating on the international level. One of the reasons
why BIFFEX (Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange) was terminated and
replaced by FFAs is that there were no forward products attached to different shipping
routes separately. It generated low volatility and low hedging performance, which was
followed with small dealing volume and customers’ distrust. Hence, the new SCFI is
believed to be a much better helper for containerized derivatives development as a
market teller.
Furthermore, hedge ratio and hedging efficiency are the straight and obvious
1

estimating criterion for hedging performance of derivatives. They are also the
assessment tools used in the exchanges for deciding whether futures or forwarding
agreements are superior or not. It is used to see to what degree the forward
agreements have reduced the risk, which is calculated in terms of earning. The earliest
scholars who launch the complete hedge theory are Keynes.J.M (1930) and J.R.Hicks
(1946). In their point of view a hedger will try decrease his or her physical market risk
by obtaining an opposite and equal amount in the future market. Later on, Johnson
(1960) and Stein (1961) put forward the idea that hedging stands for combining hold
volumes of physical market with the ones of futures market, where there should have
an optimal hedge ratio to achieve the most return. It should be calculated by
minimizing the variance of return and was also called as MV Hedge Ratios.
Ederington (1979) proposed an indicator for hedging efficiency, which was still based
on the above idea. This indicator explains the risk-reducing degree by calculating the
difference of return variance without hedging and the one with hedging.
Besides, since both FFAs and SSEFC container forward contracts are derivatives
from shipping industry, it makes FFA the only one and perfect model for
containerized freight forward contracts to compare and learn from. However, FFA has
more advantages which mainly come from the difference between bulk market and
container market. The significant one will be the market nature of the two, imperfectly
competitive market vs. oligopoly market.
There have been several articles discussed the hedging efficiency in FFA market
but there has no research published on containerized freight forward market yet. And
most articles, which talked about hedging efficiency, tend to be more forces on the
modeling calculation but not so much on the analyses outcomes and factors behind it.

2

1.2.

Literature Review

1.2.1. Researches of container shipping market

Studies about container shipping market are a lot.
Ma Yaohui’s (2005) focused on the role China played in the world container
transportation market. The thesis started with history of container shipping and its
evolution in China with a specified analysis on current impact (year 2005) of capacity
increasing. What’s more, it depicted a detailed picture about how “China Factor”
influences the container shipping industry in terms of rapid economic growth of China.
The thesis was closed with a well-built related analysis model to test and demonstrate
the significance of Chinese impaction.
Zhu Yiqiu, et al. (2006) stated that the monopoly extent of liner shipping in China
was relatively higher than it was in global market, when analyzing from concentration
ratio, market power and monopoly behaviors. They revealed an important point that
the real monopoly players were those abroad companies and they enjoyed the lion’s
share of the benefits. Besides monopoly also exploited the consumers’ surplus and
impeded the development of market influence of Chinese shipping lines.
Jing Ming’s article (2006) gave a peep of the circumstance of container
transportation industry before financial crisis, when the supply and demand were still
well balanced and a profitable future was promised. The author stated several
hot-spots in such growing market, including world- wide port group competition,
“China Factor”, creative add-value service, etc. However, we could also find some
hidden signals which resulting the future crash, such as huge ordering book, oil price
rising, and the non-preparation from ports side for rapid shipping development.
Although Huang Jing (2008) took things like American’s subprime crisis, oil price
rocketing, into consideration, she was still positive about the future development of
the world container shipping market. The author first discussed that most signals
3

coming from the market in 2007 were all showing a promising future, including quick
“digesting” of new building vessels, activeness of new building market, cargo volume
rising in main and branch routes, etc. Next, she presented her ideals about how market
would be in 2008. She was concerned about Asia-America haul but confident of
future challenge in 2008 with the rapidly-growing needs in Far East routes and new
markets, such as BRIC and N-11.
Before Chen Jinhai, et al. launched several model to decide the optimal price of
liner transportation in the article (2010), they first clearly defined the scope of liner
shipping. They pointed out that liner shipping industry was oligopoly, the degree of
which was also different among various routes.
Zhu Shuyu (2011) built a simulation model of container freight rate, after properly
analyzed those affecting factors behind the freight rates. He pointed out not only what
factors they were, but also how the factors were affecting the container freight rates.
In his opinion, among all the affecting factors, transportation cost and structure of
supply and demand were the most important ones. Furthermore, he also clearly
explained the influence of financial crisis on the Far-East trip market and found out
this route had the most sensitivity towards the structure of supply and demand.
Liu Guangqi, (2012) pointed out that in the first half of observation in 2012,
shipping lines collaborated with each other and pushed the freight to increase. It
succeeded in saving the market but it did not change the real danger resulting from
overcapacity. By quoting the data from both Clarkson, IMF, and SSFEC, the author
predicted that the speed of market recovery would be even slower and required
effective control of new-build and idle capacities from shipowners.
Since the cyclicity of shipping industry is known to all, Chen Jihong, et al. (2012)
discussed the trend of shipping lines’ development in terms of overcapacity, gigantism,
and volatility of freight and hire. Writers also gave out suggestion about future
developing strategy, such as slowsteaming, building long-term relationship with
customers, exploring new markets and more focusing on the change of ship designing.
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1.2.1. Researches of futures and forward market of shipping industry

Prof. Kavussanos and Visvikis obviously had contributed most in FFA market
researches. They (2004) first analyzed the market interaction of returns and volatilities
between spot and forward shipping freight market. The results indicated that FFA had
sharp price discovering power and discovered information quicker than physical
market.
Chinese scholars also showed great interest in this area.
Su Tongjiang, et al. (2008) introduced the components of FFA, as well as other
shipping derivatives. Writers stress the importance and main benefits of all kind of
forward contracts and argued that it was a must for China to have her own shipping
derivatives. Gong Xiaoxing (2008) analyzed the three oil transportation routes (TD3,
TD5 and TD7) to find the relation of spot and FFA markets. In addition, the author
was also able to compare the market before and after FFA was launched and to see the
effectiveness.
Dai Yong, in his article (2009), briefly described the history and current situation of
FFA and discussed the main features of FFA. Author pointed out there was an urgent
desire of all kinds of financial tools (not only FFA), if Shanghai wanted to be a
financial shipping center. Zhao Guotiao (2009) picked the most used FFA
contract--BPI T/C Average as studying object to dig up the relationship of spot and
future market price. By using VAR model, a bidirectional causality relation was found
and several differences between those markets were also mentioned.
Xi Pei, et al. (2010) discussed three function of FFA, i.e. hedging, speculating and
arbitraging, with specified practical examples. This article was also trying to
forecasting the FFA market from supply and demand aspect and historical data. Zhao
Haiyang’ thesis (2010) presented the idea that a good operation of FFA required a
thorough prediction of BDI. In order to have such prediction, the author did a lot of
work about market characteristics analyses. Furthermore, a few domestic and abroad
practical instances were used to illustrate to the risk aversion outcome of FFA.
5

Yu Jia (2010) mentioned different outcomes of risk aversion approach, including
traditional fleet management, FFA and freight option. Route C4 was used to analyze
the market risk in terms of daily earing, by using Value at Risk model.
Gong Xiaoxing(2011) studied the development of FFA market and concluded it in
three stage—steady increasing, sharp increasing with volatility and decreasing with
volatility. Several price-affecting factors were raised, such as financial and economic
condition, technology, supply and demand, and contract durations.

Although a few of articles did not directly talked about FFAs but they are closely
related to shipping derivatives.
In Wang Ying’ thesis (2012), the efficiency of Shanghai container freight price was
test by using SCFI and result was negative. Both European and U.S. West failed to be
a mature market and were relatively risky to enter into.
Song Shan (2008) discussed the reason why Shanghai oil futures market was not
efficient. And some of the reasons were low quality of market information, low
degree of market operational control power, unqualified investors and so on. Luo
Sizhe (2010) also pointed out that several factors could be impeding Shanghai oil
futures to give a full play of its function, including limited kinds of futures products,
poor market information statistics, late issuing system…etc.

1.2.3. Researches of hedging efficiency of futures and forward contracts

The theory of hedging was stared with Keynes (1923) and Hicks (1946). They
thought the spot and futures market were probably moving together and the returns or
loss in physical market should offset the ones from futures market. Therefore, hedgers
could contract in futures market with an opposite direction and equal amount
comparing to physical market.
However, Working (1960) argued that there existed a basic risk where spot price
had different volatility from futures prices. Besides, he believed that instead of
6

risk-reduction, making profits through basic risk was more crucial. In other words,
hedging could be thought as speculating behavior.
Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961) tried to analyze the motivation of hedging from
the portfolio point of view. They put forward the idea that hedger need not to have the
equal dealing volumes in both market. Instead, they should decide their volumes
according to the correlation between those two markets. The optimal hedge ratio (h)
should be calculated by the following formula in the condition of minimizing the
variance of return:
h=Cov(△S,

△F)/ Var(△F)

Where S means spot price
F means futures price
Based on the above theories, Ederington (1979) proposed a standard way of
measuring hedging efficiency by comparing the dropping degree of variance of return
with hedging and the one without. To put it in a mathematic way:
He= [Var(△S)—Var(R)]/Var(△S)
Where △S means return without hedging
R means return with hedging
Cecchetti, et al. (1988) used ARCH model to estimate the optimal hedge ratio in U.S.
Bonds market and discovered the ratio varying largely with time.

Lately there have also been a lot researches carried out by Chinese scholars.
Yuan Xiang, et al. (2001) summarized existing three measuring methods and
comparing their features among each other. Zhang Xuedong, et al. (2002) provided
several mathematical models to calculate the optimal hedge ratio and hedging
efficiency. Wang Jun, et al. (2005) studied hedging effect of Chinese hard wheat,
soybean, copper and aluminum futures market by applying OLS, B-VAR, ECM and
EC-GARCH hedging models. Authors suggested that ECM and EC-GARCH had
better results since they took the co-integration into consideration.
BGARCH(1, 1)-ECT(error correct term) model used in Liu Wei’s thesis (2005),
because it was the one that took co-integration and time-varying factor into
7

consideration. Peng Hongfeng, et al. (2006) even developed a modified
ECM-GARCH model to figure out the optimal hedge ratio, which was based on
Kroner and Sultan (1993)’s model. After comparing the evaluation outcomes among
BGARCH and the above two models, the modified one was believed to have the most
significant effect on risk hedging.
Wu Xianzhi (2009) also used models OLS, VAR, ECM and CRACH to analyze the
optimal hedging ratio of CSI300 stock index futures and discovered that GARCH
model had the best hedging efficiency.
Both Chen Zhenhua (2010) and Shen Yun (2011) used OLS, B-VAR, B-VCME and
GARCH models to calculating the optimal hedging ratio of Shanghai and Shenzhen
300 stock index futures and gold futures respectively. Zheng Qiufang (2010) also used
the above models plus an ECM-GARCH model to analyze the optimal ratio.

There are several articles specific to hedging efficiency in shipping market.
Prof. Kavussanos was the leader in shipping derivatives area, he and Prof.

Nomikos (1999) evaluated time-varying hedge ratio of BIFFEX market by a
BGARCH model with an error correction and developed a GARCH-X model with
specified conditional covariance matrix of error correction. After comparing the
results generated from the mentioned two models and constant hedge ratio,
GARCH-X was found to have the best risk-reduction.
Zhu Jian (2007) picked route C4 and BPI T/C Averages research objects, because
they had the most dealing volumes respectively among voyage charter routes and time
charter routes. After calculated the hedging efficiency by minimizing the variance of
return, the authors found there were a huge difference better difference routes and the
voyage charter routes had better hedge performance than time charter routes.
Xiao Yiming (2009) estimated the hedge ratio of BCI, BPI and BSI routes by
applying Kendall’s rank correlation model, Copula model and GED-GARCH model.
And by comparing the rate of return before and after the hedging, a high hedging
performance was found.
Sheng Wucheng, et al. (2010) chose four products (4TC-P Average, 4TC-C Average,
8

P2A and P3A) out of FFA market as research objects and used the B-VAR, ECM and
EC-GARCH models to estimate the hedging efficiency. By comparing the results,
they concluded that the P2A and P3A had the better efficiency and there was a close
relation between hedging efficiency and rate of return.
The point that voyage charter routes had better hedging performance than time
charter routes was raised in Lv Lingying’thesis (2011). The author also argued that in
practice that first month FFA price was more effective than current and second month
FFA price. OLS, B-VAR, B-VCME and GARCH models were used to finding optimal
hedge ratio. Additionally, a GED-EGARCH model was used to calculate the VaR
results in Li Wei’ thesis (2011) because of the fat tail and spiked peak distribution
feature of daily return. In addition, the thesis also tested the feasibility of applying
VaR measurement to liner risk assessment of FFA.
Zhu Yiqiu, et al. (2012) found out during and after the financial crisis, the hedging
efficiency was even better than before the crisis, by comparing the results coming
from models of VAR and DVEC. They also discovered that some products of FFA
market had already had a relatively high performance of 75%.
Xu Jing (2010) discussed the performance of both futures and options in aviation
industry and found out that aviation fuel price was the hedging market driver. Hedgers
tended to change the hedge ratio according to the prediction of fuel price.

1.3. The framework of this thesis

As we can see from the above review of past research, great deals of paper have
been written about hedging efficiency. However, there still exist a few rooms for my
analysis.
1. There have been limited studies done about containerized freight forward
agreements and other derivatives of container shipping.
2. No hedging efficiency researches have been made about SSEFC container forward
contracts.
9

3. Market nature was seldom taken into consideration when evaluating hedging
efficiency. People tend to be more focus on mathematic terms.
4. Most articles concluded with results from various models. They all lack proper
analysis and discussion the reasons and influence behind such results.
Since SSEFC container forward market is relatively new, there are numerous areas
waiting us to explore. The thesis starts with proper discussion about container
shipping market and SSEFC container forward contracts. Several issues of market
features and current situation are the key studying points, such as overcapacity, trend
of freight rates, SCFI, components of forward contacts and so on. Next, an
introduction of hedging efficiency is raised and the logic process is also stated. After
the data are prepared, OLS and GARCH model will be applied to evaluate the optimal
hedge ratio and hedging efficiency.
This thesis can be roughly divided into 4 parts.
(1). Current market situation analysis of container shipping and its forward
market.
(2). Introduction of the theory of optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency
(3). Data preparation and empirical evaluation by using OLS and GARCH model
(4). Analyzing the outcome to find the reasons of hedging differences between
FFA and SSEFC container forward contracts, as well as between the models.
The motivation of this paper is to discuss the development of the containerized
freight forward in terms of hedging performance. By comparing the hedging
efficiency with BFA, writer wants to find the reasons behind the difference and try to
dig up the existing problems living in the SSEFC container forward contracts.

Chapter 2 Overviews of container shipping market and its freight
market

Container transportation is the major way for counties all over the world to carry
out trading activities. It derives from seaborne trading. Ever since containers were
10

invented by Malcom Maclean, an evolution of shipping was taken placed. The idea of
container came from truck. Mr.Maclean thought it should be more efficient to loading
and discharging the whole truck rather than handling those bags or packages. The
needs of human labor decrease sharply, while the accuracy and productivity go up.
Those boxes also changed the old shipping model in terms of port operation, vessel
operation and even trading. One of the most important advantages of using containers:
is that containers link all transportation stages together. Once cargoes are stuffed
inside a container, there is no need to open them to handle again until they reach their
destination. It speeds up the whole process of transportation and creates a smooth
linkage among stage changes. Containers are also the reason why multimodal
transportation industry is staring to grow.
Thanks to the convenient and efficient cargo handling, vessels and ports are free
from the backward way of running. Both ports and vessels are getting larger and
larger with their complicated networks, which are designed and able to switch in order
to meet changing market situation. And their unit operational working times are
dropping. Equipment and technology are constantly created and updated to server
those magic boxes. In return, ships can sail much faster while ports can digest much
more good within less time now. The Global has never been such closer. People are
also getting excited about the unknown future.

2.1. Current situation of container shipping market

2.1.1. Demand side of container shipping market

Nowadays, more and more kinds of cargoes are carried in containers. Even some
goods which have never been loaded in those boxes are starting to be containerized.
Most of them are bulk and general cargoes like grains, used papers and limbers. Based
on data collected by Clarkson Research Team and their prediction, we can see that at
11

the end of 2012, 1,498 million tonnes of containerized cargoes are supposed to be
carried by sea. It triple the number of it is in 1999, which was only about 10 years ago.
No other dry cargoes or any other kinds of cargoes share such growth rate with
containerized cargoes.

World Seaborne Trade of Dry Cargoes
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Figure 1-World Seaborne Trade of Dry Cargoes
Source: Clarkson Database
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Figure 2-Containerized Trade Proportion
Source: Own Calculation based on Clarkson Database

As is showed in the above Figure1&2, among all the dry cargo trading,
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containerized trade seems to play the most important role in recent years. We all know
that Iron Ore and Coal usually trade together, because Iron Ore needs Coal to provide
the heat when making steel. The sudden rise of Iron Ore is taken place between 2007
and 2008, which probably due to China development and her preparation for 2008
Olympics. Except this, there is no other kind of dry cargo trading but containerized
one enjoys a huge and constant growth. Ever since 2007, Containerized trading is the
biggest part of all dry cargo trading and is also believed to be in the future.
Another point we need to notice is that except containerized trading, other dry
cargo trading tend to be stabilized in past 5 years. Only containerized trading still
shows great possibility of continues increasing in the future. In other words, the
market of containerized trade is still in its rising stage, so there exists more
opportunity and more interested are showed by customers.
When comparing containerized trade with the old fashion trade, i.e. the bulk trade,
containerized trade stands in an absolutely winning status. Not only the total trading
amount is greater, but also the increasing rate is larger. From 2011 to 2012, the
increasing rate for Containerized trade, Iron Ore, Coal and Grain are 8.16%, 3.8%,
4.05% and 1.16% respectively. It is amazing that containerized trade is able to keep
such high increasing rate after hit so badly by financial crisis.

Containerized Trade
1600
1400
Million tonnes

1200
1000

Iron Ore

800

Coal

600

Grain

400

Container

200
0

Figure 3-Containerized Trade
Source: Clarkson Database
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Figure 4-Seaborne Trade Growth Rate
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

As can be seen from the above figure, the growth rate of containerized trade is way
higher than total dry cargo trade and total oil trade before financial crisis. There is no
doubt that back then everyone would think container shipping industry is such a
promising market. Unfortunately, the bubble was popped suddenly. It dropped by
9.77%, which is almost double the damage total dry cargo and total oil trade were
faced. It was definitely a disaster. However, within 2 years, the container shipping
market is already starting to recover. It may not increase as much as it used to be, but
it is able to recover faster than other trading.
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Figure 5-World GDP Growth Rate
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

China played an essential role in developing of seaborne trade. We have all noticed
that between 2007 and 2008, a relatively higher growth rate starts to kick in. That is
also the period when China tries to promote its development. Let us see it from the
viewpoint of GDP growth rate. Before financial crisis, the GDP growth rate of China
is about triple the number of World GDP growth rate. For example, in 2007, the
growth rate of China and World are 14.2% and 5.4%. At the same time, the growth
rate of European and U.S.A are only 3.2% and 1.9%. It is obvious that China will be
believed to be the new engine of the world development. It may not produce as much
as European and U.S.A, but it definitely it has more potential and power.
During the financial crisis, European and U.S.A were hurt enormously. The whole
seemed to cease developing. China strived to survive from such horror. Especially in
2009, when all the major countries in the world had negative GDP growth rate, China
and few Asia countries succeed in keeping ascending. The growth rate of China that
year is 9.2% and other countries with positive number are Korea and India. Their rates
are 0.3% and 6.8% respectively.
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2.1.2. Supply side of container shipping market

By the end of 2012, the world container fleet capacity is 15,296,000 TEU with a
growth rate of 7.78% comparing to 2011. Within 5 years (2007-2012), the capacity
enjoyed an over 60% increase. Such rapid growth indicates the power of container
shipping industry and also confidence of liner operators before the crisis.
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Figure 6-World Liner Fleer Capacity
Source: Clarkson Database

In order to compare the container fleet with others, let us discuss it in million dwt
term. The figure below tells the same trend the TEU figure does. The container fleet
was first doubled in less than 10 years (1996-2005), and then it was doubled again in
next around-5-year period (2006-2012). It started with 45 million dwt in 1996 and
ended with 197 million dwt in 2012. We can also wittiness a smoother increasing rate
in the recent 2-3 years. It seems like the trend of the container fleet growth is coming
to an adjusting stage.
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Figure 7-Container Fleet
Source: Clarkson Database
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Figure 8-Container Fleet Proportion
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database
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Figure 9-Tanker Fleet Proportion
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database
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Figure 10-Bulker Fleet Proportion
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

The above figures are presenting how much a kind of vessel weights in the total
world fleet. They are calculated both in million dwt and number terms. When
comparing container fleet with tanker and bulker fleets, we can find that not only in
million dwt term, but also in number term, the container fleet is way behind others.
However, it is the only fleet that keeps growing in the past 16 years. The capacity of
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container vessels doubled in a 10-year period (1996-2006) and kept rising. Nowadays,
about 13% of the world capacity is contributed by container ships.
Besides, the growing rate of numbers of container ships is higher than the total dwt,
which means each new build container ships is getting bigger and bigger. The same
phenomenon can only be seen in bulker shipping marker in the past two years.
By comparison, the tendency of tanker fleet is like a slow declining slope in terms
of million dwt. On the other hand, the proportion of the number of tanker ships is able
to maintain at 15% for years. Bulker fleet has kept the same level for over 10 years. It
only begins to grow in the past 2 year.
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Figure 12-New building growth rate
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

As is well-known, the sharp growth of world fleet capacity comes from the over
order in 2008 and 2009. Most shipping companies are over confident and wrongly
predict the developing trend of the shipping industry. Of course, no one can possible
foresee the crisis. But even after the crisis, orders for new built vessels are still
relatively high. Probably because shipping companies want to take advantages of the
current low ordering prices. The same thing is also happening in tanker and bulker
markets.
Figure12 also illustrates the gigantism of the container ships and the ships are likely
getting even bigger in the future, since the gap between the proportion in million dwt
terms and the proportion in number term is widening. The phenomenon of gigantism
can be proved the current market situation as well. For example, the Emma Maersk
and the newly ordered 20 Triple-E vessels are definitely telling the world that a brand
new age for huge container vessels is coming now.
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Container Ship Demolition Rate
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Figure 13-Container Ship Demolition Rate
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

When checking the scrape market, a sudden jump of 18% in dwt term can be found
in 2009. Owing to the bad market, most shipowners and shipping companies shorten
the lifespan of those old container vessels. Generally, the demolition rate in dwt term
is below the rate in number term. It means that ships which got scraped are relatively
small ones when comparing to those which are still running. Without doubts, smaller
and older ships are the first choice to get rid of. But it also proves that the container
ships are actually getting larger during the past few years.

2.1.3. The balance of demand and supply

As is mentioned above, containerized trade is the biggest part among all dry cargo
trading, while the container ships’ capacity is relatively the small portion among the
world fleet. It explains why the container ships need to sail faster than others to meet
the demands and why they are getting bigger. However, it does not mean that it gives
free pass to container fleet to become enormously large. Overcapacity has always
been the top questions faced by people in the shipping industry.
The Figure 14 illustrates that growth rate containerized trade and container fleet
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for the past 12 years. It is really quite funny when the growth rate of supply reaches
its peak of 14.95% in 2007, the demand side drops to its bottom of -9.77% so quickly
in 2 years. It demonstrates the impossibility of market foreseeability and how much
damage the crisis has caused. There is no doubt that it is unhealthy to have
oversupplied market. Therefore, it is worse when the supply side is keeping growing.
There is no certainty that a recovering market can digest such huge amount of
overcapacity. It seems like that more time is required before the market back to
normal.
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Figure 14-Growth Rate of Demand and Supply in Container Shipping Market
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

2.2. Current situation of containerized freight market

Containerized freight market is very volatile and heavily depended on factors both
inside and outside its own market, such as situation of supply and demand, world
economy, the nature of the container shipping marker, costs of transportation and
technology. Since shipping industry is a derived market from trading market, it is
mainly driven by situation of supply and demand. Whenever there is a fall in demand
side, a remarkable decline can be seen in the freight market as is present in the
previous section. One reason is that supply side is not as flexible as demand side. It
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takes huge money and very long time to alter carrying capacities. There are limited
options left for shipowners and shipping companies when the market is down.
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Figure 15-CCFI Composite Index from Apr.2003 to Jan. 2013
Source: Clarkson Research Services 2013

Figure15 reveals the fact that containerized freight market fluctuates in a cycle of
around 5 years and it seems like the whole trend is heading down. Every 5 year a peak
and bottom can be witnessed at least. Those peaks and bottoms are usually linked
with a significant world event. For example, the depressing freight market in 2009 is
probably the outcome of financial crisis started in the U.S.A. in 2008. Because the
shipping industry is becoming more and more complicated, the recent movement of
the freight market is really hard to guess. The market once seemed to have recovered
from the crisis which happened in 2008. However, it is down again in 2011. No one
has ever experienced such a bad market. Some pessimists even predict that over
one-third of the existing shipping companies are going to be shut down and more
merges and acquisitions are expected to happen.
The reason why this crisis does so much damage is that it attacked the shipping
industry beyond anyone’s expectation. No one has imaged the American subprime
mortgage crisis can drag container shipping into this trouble. The bigger a shipping
company is, the more damage it gets. Because it will have more idle capacities to deal
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with and more employees to feed.
Judging from the current data and market situation, the containerized freight market
is getting stabilized. However, there still exist several potential dangers. For instance,
the current steady market is created by the shipping companies. It does not tell the real
story of the market. They rearrange the network of the shipping hauls and lay up a
few ships on purpose in order to build a relatively balanced market for the sake of
maintaining the price level. How long this is strategy can work remain questionable.
Besides, there has not been any effective and immediate way of solving the
increasingly severe issue of overcapacity. Laying up vessels is a short-term solution.
Substantial measures is requiring since there is no sign of the rise of the demand side.

2.2.1. Physical containerized freight market

2.2.1.1. Introduction of SCFI
Freight index is designed to reflect how the freight rate goes and to what degreed it
fluctuates. Each datum of the index is the result of the freight rate at time t dividing by
the rate at time 0. Freight index begins in dry bulk market in London. In 1985, the
Baltic Exchange issue the first freight index—BFI (Baltic Freight Index). Years later,
in 1999, BFI is replaced by BDI in order to better indicate the dry bulk freight market.
The calculation method of BDI was changed in 1st July, 2009 and the current formula
applied is as follow:

0.113473601

Where TCavg = Time charter average.1

Containerized freight index starts in Shanghai. Back to 13th April, 1998, CCFI

1.

http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=561&IndexGroupID=5
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(China Containerized Freight Index) is first launched by SSE (Shanghai Shipping
Exchange). It has 11 sample services with 10 different port of loading, including
Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao and etc. The discharging ports are not specified.
The freight rates and other data are collected from 16 shipping lines both national and
international. The basis period of CCFI is 1st January1998 and the base index is 1000
point. CCFI is issued on every Friday.
CCFI has been proved that it has done perfectly as marker teller and has been
chosen to be the authoritative data by UN. However, it is not qualified enough to be
based on by a forward agreement. Because its function is largely restricted in
measuring relation between supply and demand. It is not objective enough and has
low time-efficiency, since it only takes data from liner companies. Therefore, SCFI
(Shanghai Containerized Freight index) is invented by using a brand-new formation.
It presents the freight rates of the outbound containers when the port of loading is
always Shanghai port. The 15 routes used to form the index cover almost all the
services the Shanghai port have as loading port. They are Shanghai-Europe(base port)
service, Shanghai-Med(base port) service, Shanghai-WC America(base port) service,
Shanghai-EC America(base port) service, Shanghai-Persian Gulf (Dubai) service,
Shanghai-ANZ (Melbourne) service, Shanghai-W Africa (Lagos) service, Shanghai-S
Africa (Durban) service, Shanghai-S America (Santos) service, Shanghai-W Japan
(base port) service, Shanghai-E Japan (base port) service, Shanghai- SE Asia
(Singapore) service, Shanghai-Korea (Pusan) service, Shanghai-Taiwan (Kaohsiung)
service, Shanghai-Hong Kong service. The different freight rates on the above routes
are combined on different weight. For example, the weight of Shanghai-Europe (base
port) service and Shanghai-WC America (base port) service are 20%, while the weight
of Shanghai-Med (base port) service drop to 10%.
More importantly, freight rates on each route are collected from shipping
companies, cargo owners and forwarding companies to make SCFI more objective
than CCFI. The total number of the members in editorial committee is 30 now and
half of them are not shipping lines. Surcharges are also included, such BAF, CAF,
PCS and so on. The basis period of SCFI is 16th October, 2009 and base index is 1000
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point.
According to the SSE, the calculating method they apply to the comprehensive
SCFI is a simple weighted average one.2 And numbers of sample companies who are
required to provide the freight rates on one service route are varying among different
weights of the service route. The more weight the service is, the more sample
information is needed.
𝑚

𝐼 = ∑ (𝑃𝑖
𝑖=1

𝑊𝑖
) 1000
𝑃𝑖0

Where, I means the comprehensive SCFI, i means the service route, m means the
number of service, 𝑷𝒊 means the freight rate of service route i, 𝑷𝒊𝟎 means the
freight rate of service route i on the base date, 𝑾𝒊 means the weight of the service.

Apart from the SCFI, the SSE publishes the spot freight rates on the stated 15
routes every week as well.

2.2.1.2. The volatility of containerized freight rates
When comparing weekly data of SCFI and BDI within the time period of
2011/7-2012/12, two important things can be notice that SCFI and BDI have opposite
trends and the volatility of SCFI is way smaller than BDI. Obviously, BDI enjoys
more and larger ups and downs during the observation period, which probably result
from the calculation form of SCFI. Different from BDI, SCFI does not takes vessel
size into consideration and the market volatility is smoothed by the calculation of
combining all trading routes together to some extent. Besides, the containerized
freight market is more or less controlled by the big shipping lines. Therefore, the
freight rates face little fluctuations than the ones in dry bulk market. Nevertheless,
when looking into specific trading routes, a much higher volatility can be found in the
containerized freight market. Since the research is more focus on the physical and

2.

http://www.sse.net.cn/index/scfiintronew.jsp
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paper freight market on EU and UW routes, the EU-S (spot freight rate of Europe
service) and UW-S (spot freight rate of west coast of United States service), which
also are published by SSE, are more suitable for the further study.
Both EU-S and UW-S were embraced by a sharp jump during the end of 2011 and
the growing trends tend to continue in the following half year. EU-S first slowed
down its speed of increase and started to fall, which was followed by UW-S about 3
month later. EU-S hit its peak 1934USD/TEU in 4th May 2012, while UW-S reached
its highest point 2783USD/FEU in 10th August 2012. During the rest period of the
observation, both indexes faced a smooth decline and the slope of EU-S was a bit
sharper than UW-S. By the end of 2012, EU-S and UW-S were 1218USD/TEU and
2223 USD/FEU respectively. And they were still much higher than the beginning
period of the observation, which were 821USD/TEU and 1652USD/FEU.
Since the observation is less than 2 year, the seasonality can hardly be confirmed.
There do seem to have a short cycle during the 1.5 year period. The third and fourth
quarters are the peak season and first and second quarters are the off season. However,
it seems to be opposite to the regular season pattern. Therefore, it is more sensible to
take the whole trend as a growing trend. After all, the container shipping is striving to
recover.
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Figure 16-SCFI Comprehensive Index from 2011.7.1-2012.12.28
Source: Clarkson Research Services 2013
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Figure 17-BDI from 2011.7.1-2012.12.28
Source: Clarkson Research Services 2013
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Figure 18-Frieght rates on EU&UW route from 2011.7.1-2012.12.28
Source: SSEFC application

On the contrary, BDI was suffering a falling trend during the observation period. It
started to collapse at the beginning of 2012 and hit its bottom 647 at 3rd February.
Unfortunately, BDI failed to bounce back and such trend kept on going even outside
the observation period. Suppose we divided BDI into 2 periods. First one was from
the beginning to the end of February of 2012 and the other was from March to the end
of 2012. By comparing the average of those 2 periods, we could find that a difference
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of 590(average of first period was 1513, while average of the second one was 922),
which was 39% of the average of first part. In other words, over one-third potential
profits were vanished from the market within only 2 month.
Besides, during the second period, small ups and downs were still noticeable. Each
one of them only lasted for a very short time (about 1 month). However, Seasonality
was nowhere to be found.
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Table 1- Features of EU-S, UW-S, SCFI and BDI
Average

Average

Average change rate

C.V3

STDEV

Change
Range
EU-S

1147.70

5.29

1.08%

0.38

439.53

UW-S

2045.64

7.61

0.51%

0.21

436.48

BDI

1179.88

-9.39

-0.55%

0.37

435.77

SCFI

1155.65

1

0.20%

0.17

193.78

Apart from the trend difference, there are several other features as well.
(1).Containerized freight market is no less volatile than dry bulk freight market.
The coefficient of variation of EU-S is even larger than BDI. Besides, EU-S had the
largest increase of 600USD/TEU within one week. UW-S seems to be a little week.
However, it also went through several fluctuations about 400USD/FEU. All three
series are quite dynamic during the observation period.
(2). EU-S enjoyed bigger changes, while volatility of UW-S is also more frequent.
Average volatility rate of EU-S was double of UW-S.
(3).On the one hand, Volatility of EU-S and UW-S was more significant after
February 2012, i.e. after they went through a sharp rise. Before that, the changes of
both containerized indexes were very minor. On the other hand, BDI was relatively
more equally volatile over the whole period.
(4).Fluctuating pattern among EU-S, UW-S and BDI were different. EU-S and
UW-S usually went through a short and smooth decrease period after every sudden
jump. It was probably because that these 2 indexes were experiencing a rising trend.
On contrast, BDI was more symmetrical to the zero axes.

3.

Coefficient variance= STDEV /Average, Manolis, G. Kavussanos, Ilias, D. Visvikis. (2006).
Derivatives and Risk Management in Shipping. Witherby Seamanship International.
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2.2.2. Containerized freight forward market

2.2.2.1. Introduction of SSEFC container forward contracts
Containerized freight forward agreements are a new member in the big shipping
derivative family. By the matching of Clarkson, the first CFSA (Containerized Freight
Swap Agreements) is settled between Morgan-Stanly and a Belgium shipping
company—Delphis in 15th January 2010. It is first deal that has been done based on
SCFI. In 28th June, 2011, SSEFC container forward contracts are launched by the
SSEFC (Shanghai Shipping Freight Exchange Company) and SSEFC itself is founded
in 25th March, 2010. SSEFC establishes an exchanging platform for shipowners, cargo
owners, ship operators, forwarders, NVOCC and investors. They can trade with a
maximum 6 month products. Up to now, it only has two different services available
for SSEFC container forward market, i.e. the Europe service and the West Coast of
America service, because these two are the most typical services. Over half of the
outbound containers are heading for Europe, Mediterranean areas, west and east coast
of America. Europe and Mediterranean services share the same trend in terms of
freight rate. And so do services of west coast of America and east coast of America.
With simple calculation, freight rate of east coast of America service can easily be
turned into the one of west coast of America service. Therefore, choosing 2 services
out of 4 is absolutely enough to cover 4 main routes.
SSEFC has already developed about 30 memberships, including commercial
bankers, shipping companies and agencies. It is planning to have additional 100
members inside China and dozens members outside the country. SSEFC also
welcomes single individuals to join the market. Everyone with an ID card and its copy
can open an account at SSEFC.
Although the contracts of SSEFC container forward contracts are marked with
dollar terms, it settles in RMB terms. The exchange rate is based on the rate issued by
China Foreign Exchange Trading System. a day before the contract date.
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Since financial service in Shanghai is not as mature as it is in London, the market
can hardly been promoted by brokers outside the exchange. E-platform for bidding is
more suitable for this market to gain more liquidity and more volumes. Customers can
have access to the business by easily downloading an application on SSEFC website.
The system will matching the deal automatically with a connection to a bank, where a
marginal account is opened. 20% of the deal is required to be put down as initial
margin and a daily clearance is taken placed in that account according to the market
price.

2.2.2.2. The volatility of SSEFC container forward contracts
In order to analyze the volatility of SSEFC container forward market, EU1212 and
UW1212 are taken as examples. It began at first workday of July and lasted till the
last Friday of December 2012. Both products shared similar trend during the
transaction period. They went through smooth decline at the first half period and
quickly started to recover in the second half. UW1212 experienced a flatter slope of
decrease and was succeed in bouncing back. On contrast, EU1212 was more struggled
and only crawled back half way of what it had lost. The lowest price of EU1212 was
960 USD/TEU at 21st September 2012, while UW1212 could be most cheaply traded
at 2090 USD/FEU at 25th Sep. Over all, both products were full of small rises and
falls and the trends were very close to the trends of EU-S and UW-S during the same
period.
Regarding to the rate of return, both products were changing within the range of
-0.6-0.6. EU1212 was flatter in the first 3 month, when it was the time UW1212
enjoyed the most fluctuating. On the other hand, when EU1212 began to have bigger
waves, UW1212 cooled down and kept such form for over 3 month.
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Figure 21-SSEFC Procudt1212
Source: SSEFC application
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Figure 22-Rate of Return of 1212

Table 2- Features of Product EU1212 and UW1212
Average

STDEV

C.V

EU1212

1258.694

136.363

0.108

UW1212

2302.968

65.208

0.028

Additionally, EU1212 had more and larger ups and downs than UW1212, which
was also similar to the situations of EU-S and UW-S. Since the STDEV of EU1212
was twice bigger than UW1212, the volatility of EU1212 was much more dynamic
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than UW1212. Furthermore, products 1212 did not seem to be the best choice of
making money for those who took the buying position.

2.2.2.3. Functions of SSEFC container forward contracts
(1).Risk hedging
The original purpose of forward agreements is to avert the market risk and
uncertainty. At the cost of surrendering potential larger profit margin, both seller and
buyer can lock the earning and expense in advance. It keeps constant and stable cash
flow for both parties. Forward contracts work like this:
Let us suppose that today is the end of June in 2012. A shipping line is going to sail
to Europe with a capacity of 5,000 TEU at the end of December 2012. The prevailing
freight is 1900 USD/TEU in both spot and forward market. The company fears that
the freight rate may drop in the future. In order to lock the current price, the company
can sell 5,000 units of the forward contacts of Europe service to another party, who
may think the freight market is going to rise.
①By the end of December 2012, the freight rate does decrease and it drops to 1200
USD/TEU. The shipping company can close contracts at that price. The gain and loss
of the shipping lines can be listed as follow:
In physical market, it suffer a (1200-1900)*5000=-3,500,000 loss.
In forward market, it gains (1900-1200)*5000=3,500,000
②There is a possibility that the freight rate may increase to 2600 USD/TEU by the
end of December 2012. The gain and loss of the shipping lines can be listed as follow:
In physical market, it gains (2600-1900)*5000=3,500,000
In forward market, it suffer a (1900-2600)*5000=-3,500,000 loss.
A shipper or people who have opposite expectation of shipping lines will take
buyer’s position in the forward market. And the outcome will also totally opposite.
In practice, it is very rare that the spot and forward price are equivalent to each
other. Due to the basis risk and the calculation methods, there will be an obvious price
difference. That is to say, there will be no perfect hedging. It is also the reason why an
optimal hedge ratio is required to maximize the return. Besides, currently, there are
34

only few hedgers in the SSEFC market. Most players step into this market with the
intention of speculating.

(2). Speculation and arbitrage
Speculation and arbitrage are carried out by people who have no exposure in the
physical market. They have no needs to set off the physical risks.
Speculators only rely on their expectation. They may try to get the right one by
various ways. They may make a fortune when they have the right guess. But at the
same time, they have to bear huge risk of losing all the money they put in.
Arbitragers secure their position and reduce their risk largely by entering more than
one market or trading more than one kind of products simultaneously. They take
advantages of price difference among markets as well as among products.
They promote forward market to some extent as well as create bubbles. A balanced
amount of speculation and arbitrage is desired, especially for containerized forward
market where there is a notable power gap between shipping lines and cargo owners.

(3). Price discovery
Right before containerized forward were invented, the freight rate is likes secrets
sealed inside shipping companies. With the help of forward market, the freight rate is
becoming more transparent and more open to public. Especially when the
participators are people who are equipped with abundant specialty knowledge and
have access to comprehensive information, the forward price will reflect how the
freight rate goes more precisely in a certain amount of time.
A large number of researches have been done and they all hold the idea that usually
forward price is ahead of spot price. All market related information will be first
mirrored in paper market and then to the physical market 4. It is because that all the
experience, knowledge and information will turn into expectation first. And those

4.

Manolis, G. Kavussanos, Ilias, D. Visvikis. (2006). Derivatives and Risk Management in Shipping.
Witherby Seamanship International.
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expectations can be indicated by forward contracts. Further down, they will have an
influence on the physical market.
The containerized forward market elevates the status of China in the international
shipping industry. From now on Shanghai will have a say in pricing of containerized
freight rates.

Chapter 3 Methodology

Basic principle of hedging means buying or selling the commodities in paper
markets by taking the opposite position of physical market to avoid the price increases
or decreases5. It locks the profits and prevents risk in advance. There are several
conditions are required:
(1).The underlining commodity should be similar. It is required to create an
environment where spot price and forward price usually are swung by the similar
factors and they share the same trend. The stronger relation two markets have, the
better hedging performance can be enjoyed. In shipping derivatives markets, choosing
the similar route or basket of routes is essential, since it is very unlikely to find exact
same trip in forward market.
(2). Hedgers should ensure the date of buying or selling in physical market is near
to the date of closure in forward market. The prices of both markets are supposed to
very close to each other.
(3). There is no need to say that a hedger takes opposite position in physical and
forward markets. However, how much he or she buy or sell in both markets is an
arguable matter. In other words, how much the hedge ratio is usually decides the
outcome of hedging. In the traditional theory, the hedge ratio is 1 because physical
and forward market is assumed to fluctuate in the exact same range and trend. Years
later, people start to realize there exists something call “basis”. It stands for the
5.

ZHU Yiqiu, ZHENG Wenzao, (2011). Methodologies and conclusions of study on market
efficiency of forward freight agreement at home and aboard.
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difference between spot price and forward price at the time t. Therefore, the hedgers
are facing a new kind of risk, i.e. basis risk. When the basis is getting bigger and
unstable, an optimal hedge ratio is desired to deal such situation.

3.1. Optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency

The hedging efficiency is largely depending on the hedge ratio. How to determine
an optimal hedge ratio has always been the core theory of hedging. Hedge ratio equals
to the dealing volume a hedger holds in futures market dividing by the volume he or
she holds in physical markets. As is mentioned above, the tradition theory is not
suitable for applying. The prevailing theory is analyzing from the viewpoint of
portfolio, invented by scholars Johnson (1960), Stein (1961) and Ederington (1979).
In their idea, what a hedger operates in physical and futures markets should be
consider as a portfolio. The volume a hedger holds in both markets should be taken as
whole. By aiming at maximization of earing of portfolio and minimization of risks,
the optimal hedge ratio is decided.
The earning with hedging can be seen as follows:

R  (St -h  Ft ) - (St - k - Ft - k - C)
 S - h  F  C
Take variance of both sides of the equation:

Var(R)  Var(S)  h 2  Var(F) - 2h  Cov(S,F)
Take derivation of h to get the optimal hedge ratio:

h 


Cov(S, F)
  s
Var(F)
f

Since the hedging efficiency was based on the dropping degree of variance of
return with hedging and the one without. Therefore, the hedging efficiency can be
presented as:

He 

Var(S) - Var(R)
Var(S)
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After having calculating the optimal hedge ratio and bring it to the above formula,
the hedging efficiency can be gained.
Where, S means the spot price, F means the futures price or forward price, R means
the return, C means the dealing cost, h means the hedge ratio, t and t-k mean t and t-k
time respectively, ρ means the correlation coefficient, δs means the standard deviation
of △S, δf means the standard deviation of △F, He means the hedging efficiency.
In order to avoid huge fluctuating of some data, △S and △F are replaced by △LnS
and △LnF.

3.2. Model introduction

3.2.1. The constant hedge ratio

OLS (ordinary least square) model was first created by Witt (1987). It is the most
common and widely- used model. This model already takes the fact that physical and
futures market do not always move in the same direction into consideration.
Additionally, it also notices that the series of prices in both markets are not stabilized.
However, the first difference of the series is stable. Therefore, in the OLS model, the
optimal hedge ratio can be gained from the liner regression as following:

S  a  h  F   t
Where a is a constant and ε is the white noise. h is the constant hedge ratio we are
looking for.

3.2.2. The time-varying hedge ratio
Engle (1982) first create ARCH (Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity)
model and it was developed into GARCH (Generalized-ARCH) model by
Bollerslev(1986). This model removes the limitation that the variance is assumed to
be constant. Besides, it takes volatility of financial time series in to consideration,
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which means it can gain a time-varying hedge ratio.
In a GARCH(p, q), the optimal hedge ratio can be evaluated by the following
regression equation:

 t～(0， 2 )

S  a  h  F   t
The equation of the conditional variance is:
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Where, t2 is the conditional variance, ω is a constant,  t is the residual error
and h is the time-varying hedge ratio.

Chapter 4 Data collection and calculation

The data will be the weekly closing price of forward contracts and spot freight rates
of EU and UW routes on every Friday from 2011.7.1, which is the first Friday closing
price of the SSEFC container forward contracts, to 2012.12.28. Data of BFABDI and
BDI will be collected in the same time period. In total, there are 76 pairs for EU and
UW series and 78 pairs of BDI and BFABDI. It is because that the SSEFC and BDI
have different closing days due different holidays in both countries.
EU used in this thesis stands for SSEFC container forward contracts on Europe
route and UW is used for forward of west coast of the United States. Both data are
published by SSEFC. BFA is the Baltic Exchange Forward Assessment, which is
collected from independent brokers for FFA market and published by the Baltic
Exchange. As quoted on the Baltic website, “The BFABDI is integrated to provide a
derived measure of the value of a forward contract for the BDI itself”. In the
following sections, the BFA will stand for BFABDI.6
EU0, UW0 and BFA0 stand for the nearest forward contacts to mature of current

6.

http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=5481
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month and EU1, UW1, BFA1 and EU2, UW2, BFA2 are collections of those forward
prices one month and two month before mature respectively.

4.1. The preparation of data

4.1.1. The feature of the series

Before applying the models to calculating the optimal hedge ratio, thorough
analyses of features of series are required. Several tests will also be carried out to
make sure data fit the conditions of using OLS and GARCH models.
By comparing the tables in appendix-I, a number of features are clearly revealed.
(1).There seems to be no linear relations between the periods before mature and the
forward prices. The longer the forward products before mature does not always mean
the higher the prices they can be. Products which are 1 month before mature have the
highest prices rate and it is true for both EU and UW routes.
(2). Linear relation between the periods before mature and volatility is found. The
closer the forward are going to mature, the more dynamic the forward price will be.
(3).Mean price of forward contracts is higher than the mean spot prices. Since both
EU and UW markets were on a rising trend, it also proves to some extent that forward
prices had a leading effect of the spot price.
(4).The volatility on EU trip is more frequent and bigger than the one of UW.
(5).The degree of declining volatility rate of UW is much larger than the one of EU
when the forward duration gets longer. STDEV of UW2 was about 376, which is
53(429-376) smaller than STDEV of UW0. On contrast, STDEV of EU2 was about
415, which only has a difference of 38 (453-415). In other words, the volatility pattern
of EU products does not change much according to the time period. Unlike UW
products, the EU market is more stable and well-connected over different time periods.
UW market seems to be more easily influenced by other factors, such as time.
Next step is to check whether the series of rate of return meet the requirements of
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being Leptokurtic Distribution or Fat-tailed Distribution like other common financial
return-rate series.7Generally speaking, financial series are under assumption of being
a Normal Distribution. However, in practice, this assumption is hardly to be fulfilled.
Therefore, data of return rates of EU route and UW route will be measured by several
indicators, including Skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera.
Skewness shows whether a series is symmetrical about its mean value. A Normal
Distribution requires Skewness to be 0. Kurtosis represents the shape of a series. It is
used to check whether its shape is tall and narrow or it is short and wide. Whenever
the value of Kurtosis is over 3, it means that the shape of the series has the feature of
being leptokurtic and fat-tailed. Jarque-Bera is the outcome of comparing the
Skewness and Kurtosis values of the series with the ones of series which obeys
Normal distribution. The bigger the value of Jarque-Bera is the closer this series is to
the Normal Distribution.8

As is illustrated in appendix-II, each series has a larger-than-3 Kurtosis value and
significant Jarque-Bera value, which indicates that all the series satisfy the
requirement of being Leptokurtic Distribution or Fat-tailed Distribution. Fat-tailed
series signify that the data distribute away from its mean value, which equals to the
fact of having a larger range of return rate.
Except series of the DLNUW2, Skewness values of all the series are over 0, which
means they have right side skews. DLNUW2 is the only series have the left side
skews. Besides, the Skewness values are declining along the mature period of forward.
The series of current month forward prices are the one that largest the Skewness
values. That is to say the distributions of rate of return of EU0 and UW0 are more far
from its mean value in a positive way, i.e. those two series should have the biggest
absolute return rates.

4.1.2. The correlation of the data
7.
8.

Zhu Jian, (2007). Empirical Analysis on the Functions of the Freight Forward Agreement Market
in International Dry Bulk Shipping.
Li Ming, Chen Shengke, (2011). The Analysis and Applications of Eviews.
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Figure 23-EU-S and Forward Contracts on EU Route
Source: Own calculation based on data from SSEFC application

UW-S and Forward Contracts on UW
Route
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Figure 24-UW-S and Forward Contracts on UW Route
Source: Own calculation based on data from SSEFC application

As is showed in Figure 23&24, a close relation between freight rate in physical
market and the one in paper market can be found. And forward products of EU route
share more similar trend of spot price than those of UW route do. It can also be
proved by the correlation coefficient showed in the tables below.

(1). Correlation Coefficient of Europe route series.
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Table 3-Correlation Coefficient of Europe route series
Correlation Coefficient

EU-S

EU0

EU1

EU2

EU-S

1

0.978376

0.95609

0.92261

EU0

0.978376

1

0.983579

0.96045

EU1

0.95609

0.983579

1

0.98322

EU2

0.92261

0.960448

0.983225

1

(1). Correlation Coefficient of UW route series.

Table 4-Correlation Coefficient of UW route series
Correlation Coefficient

UW-S

UW0

UW1

UW2

UW-S

1

0.936392

0.830433

0.70155

UW0

0.936391874

1

0.907302

0.794566

UW1

0.830433156

0.907302

1

0.932412

UW2

0.701550139

0.794566

0.932412

1

On the one hand, correlation coefficients between EU products and EU-S are all
very close to 1 and there is only minor difference among EU products. On the other
hand, only between UW-S and UW0 exists an over-0.9 correlation coefficient and it
changes relatively largely among UW products. Such weak link of UW products will
affect the following tests tremendously as well as the optimal hedge ratio.
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients decrease according to the time-period
range. The near the forward are going to mature, the larger the coefficients they will
have.
Last but not least, correlation coefficients among forward products are also very
high. And it seems like that forward contracts are closer related to each other f than to
the spot freight rate. The reason of this is probably that information flow in forward
market can move around more easily and are obtained more effortlessly when
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comparing to the physical market.

4.1.3. Analysis of basis

Basis of Forward Contracts on EU Route
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Figure 25-Basis of Forward Contracts on EU Route

Basis of Forward Contracts on UW Route
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Figure 26-Basis of Forward Contracts on UW Route

Basis is the different between the spot freight rate and the freight forward price and
it is one of the major driver-factors behind the optimal hedge ratio. Certain numbers
of features are listed as following:
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(1).Same basis trends were shared by forward products with same trip. Trends of
the basses of EU0, EU1 and EU2 were more similar to each other than those 3
products of UW route are.
(2).Forward products on UW route had a wider range of volatility due to its units.
The most significant basis of UW was around -800USD/FEU, when the one of EU
was about 500USD/TEU.
(3).Basis of EU products were more dynamic than UW ones. It was the same as the
volatility of spot price and freight forward.
(4).Both trips had positive bases in the first half of observation period and negative
bases in the rest period.
(5).The far the forward were going to mature, the more volatile the bases were.
Since more uncertainties and risks will occurs to customers in the longer period
forward, expected freight rates change more actively and hugely.

4.1.4. Several tests of data
4.1.4.1. ADF test
Unit root test is used to ensure that the series under studying are stable ones. In
other words, expected value, variance and covariance do not change according to the
time t, which can avoid the false regression. ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) test is
the one being applied.
ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) is one of the ways of unit root test and it is the
most straight forward method. As is showed in the following tables, if absolute value
of t-statistic is smaller than the absolute value of t-critical ones represented below at
different significant level, the null hypothesis is accepted and the series is non-stable.
Obviously, the original series are all non-stable ones. Therefore, ADF test are taken
again on the 1st difference of the series. Fortunately, all series are 1st difference
integration series. That is to say the rate-of-return series are suitable for the further
cointegration test.
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4.1.4.2. Johansen Cointegration test
In order to make sure return-rate series of spot freight rates and the one of freight
forward have long-term or balanced relationships, Johansen Cointegration test is
applied. It helps to further prevent the possibility of having false regression. The
precondition of using this test is the paired series are integration series on the same
level, which have been test in the above section.
As long as the values of Trace Statistic are larger than the selected critical values,
(in this case 0.05 is the significant level) the null hypothesize of having none
cointegration relations is rejected.
As is clearly stated in the above tables, both EU series and UW series passed the
test. All 6 pairs of series enjoyed a cointegration relation.

4.1.4.3. Granger Causality Test
Although high correlation coefficient has been achieved in the previous section,
it does not represent those two series have clear causality towards each other. More
importantly, Granger causality test can verify whether the previous data have effect on
the later ones. Correlation coefficient is unable to reveal the direction of the influence
and the time factor in the series.
Providing that the Probability is below the significant level, which is 0.05, the Null
Hypothesis is accepted. Or when the F-Statistic is larger enough, the causality can
also be found.
For forward products on EU route, at least one series is the cause of the other series
in each pair. However, on UW routes, the last two pairs, which are the return-rate
series pairs, fail to have significant causality. Besides, EU pairs have better outcomes
than UW ones, which are going to affect the calculation outcomes of the optimal
hedge ratio.
All detailed results of three tests are presented in appendix-III.
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4.2. The outcomes

The optimal hedge ratios is calculated by the two different models(OLS and
GARCH) which have been explained in chapter 4, while the hedging efficiency is
valued by the formula below:

He 

Var(S) - Var(R)
Var(S)

Apart from “He”, which is calculated from the viewpoint of variance, R square is
also an indicator of hedging efficiency. The better the equation is matching to the
series, the better performance of the hedging behaviors.
Results of BFA are used as assessment criterion since FFA market has longer
history and is relatively more advanced than the containerized freight forward one.
Despite the difference of market nature between those two, results of BFA are
supposed to have a leading performance and act as a good model for the SSEFC
container forward contracts to learn from.
All detailed Results of OLS model and GARCH model are listed in the appendix IIII.
The outcomes of GARCH model are supposed to be time-varying ones and the figures
showed in the attached tables are the mean values which are used to be comparing to
the results of OLS model.
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Chapter 5 Results analysis

5.1. Outcomes comparison

Results of OLS Model
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Figure 27-Results of OLS Model

Results of GARCH Model
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
EU0

EU1

EU2
h(GARCH)

UW0

UW1

He(GARCH)

UW2

BFA0

BFA1

BFA2

R^2(GARCH)

Figure 28-Results of GARCH Model

(1).Both SSEFC container forward contracts and BFA enjoy the relatively
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prominent hedging performance in the current-month contacts regardless of the
models. It makes sense since uncertainty within one month is supposed to be lowest
and information flows are most dynamic where participants can master the market
best. Moreover, when a participant faces a physical contact which will last for months,
he or she could divide the contact into several smaller ones to presume more
remarkable hedging performance in each current-month forward products, where
hedging efficiency is about 3 times larger than 2 month products.
(2). BFA series bear the descending hedging performance in both models when the
contracts duration getting longer. On contrast, SSEFC container forward contracts do
not share the same trend with BFA. On the EU route, EU2 suffers the lowest hedging
efficiency in OLS model where hedging efficiency of EU0 is the lowest in GARCH
model. On the UW trip, UW1 contracts have the tiniest hedging efficiency in both
models. Actually, even the best hedging performance of UW route contracts (UW0) is
far poorer than both EU route ones and BFA
(3).Bigger hedge ratio does not always end up with better hedging performance.
(4).BFA series have the best hedging performance as a whole followed by the EU
products. UW series suffer the most pitiful performance. It is true in both models.
(5).Outcomes of EU series are relatively more approximate to BFA ones. Especially
the hedging performance of EU0 is almost the same as the one of BFA0 in OLS
model. Whereas, the similarity drops a little bit once the calculation model is changed.
(6).Except for the EU series, both UW ones and BFA ones have very similar
outcomes in OLS and GARCH models. Nevertheless, EU series experience huge
difference in those models. Optimal hedge ratios of EU0 and EU1 face huge decline
when switch from OLS to GARCH model while the hedging efficiency remain almost
the same. It indicates that EU series are very dynamic and the same level hedging
efficiency can be kept by the help of a much lower time-varying hedge ratio. In other
words, a bunch of the investment money can be saved at no cost of its performance.

In order to get a closer look of the hedging performance in the SSEFC container
forward market, the optimal hedge ratio and the hedging efficiency of the products
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available during the observation period are also calculated by simply applying the
formula described in Chapter 4.1 instead of using the models. The products are named
after the time when they are expired and each product has duration of 6 months. For
instance, EU1212 means the forward contracts are tradable from July 2012 to
December 2012 on the Europe haul. And all the products end at the last Friday of the
last month. There are times when Friday is not the last workday of that month. A new
product will be open on those days. All the data are collection of the all the closing
price on every Friday just like the series before. National holidays are skipped since
the market is closed on those days.
The overall outcomes tell similar stories of the results above. The performance of
EU contracts is superior to the UW contracts. Average hedging efficiency on EU lane
is 0.129, while the one on UW is 0.046 which is near to 0. The UW1203 and UW1208
even have no hedging performance since the forward prices moves in the opposite
direction to the spot freight rates. The covariances of those 2 products are below zero.
The results also experience large variations. There are huge differences among
products on both routes. EU1112 and UW1211 have the best achievements (the
hedging efficiency is 0.428 and 0.238 respectively). The tiniest outcomes lay in
EU1210 (0.009) and UW1205 (0.002), except for the 2 UW products which has no
hedging performance.
Although the outcomes of EU ones are finer than UW ones, the hedge ratios are
also higher. The ratio of EU1203 even goes up to 0.95. That is to say, the participants
need to pay relatively a huge price to get access to the “pitiful” hedging function.
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Figure 29-Hedging Performance in SSEFC Container Forward Market

5.2. Factors cause such difference

Judging from the analyses of the outcomes, a few questions are raised, such as why
there exists such huge different hedging performance between the EU and UW route
and why UW1 have such a poor performance.
In the next several sections, a range of speculations will be discussed at temptation
of explaining such difference.

5.2.1. Different features of series

As has been mentioned in chapter 5, EU series and UW series are very distinct and
some of those differences may have a conspicuous impact on the outcomes.
(1).From the feature of series
① . Containerized freight market changes more frequently and has a wider
volatility range than dry bulk freight market does, which makes it harder to predict
and hedge forward risks obviously.
②.Changing pattern of containerized freight rates is more bizarre than the one of
BDI. BDI fluctuate more equally to the zero axes while EU-S and UW-S always has a
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short and smooth period getting caught between 2 sudden jumps. Additionally,
containerized freight rates are more dynamic during the back half of the observation
period (2012.3-2012.12), on the contrary, dry bulk freight market maintains the same
activeness throughout the whole period. Roughly speaking, during 2011.7-2012.12,
the BDI is on a declining trend while the SCFI is on a rising one. Probably this is one
of the reasons that causes the distinct changing patterns and other possible causer can
be the affection of the market players which will be discuss in later sections. Then
those changing patterns lead to the different hedging performance.
It can be easily understand that when a series acts like EU-S and UW-S in such an
irregularly and non-balanced way, the hedging performance is definitely going to be
hurt.
③.The most apparent issue people will notice from the calculation outcomes is the
tiny hedging efficiency of UW products, when comparing to BFA and EU ones. The
most likely reasons behind this are the change rate and coefficient of variation of
those 3 series pairs. Change rate of UW-S is the gentlest and the rate of EU-S is the
largest. The one of BDI is in the middle and more closer to EU-S. The ranking of
coefficient of variation is same as change rate as has been described in Chapter 3.1.2.
Identically, the forward prices on EU haul is more active than the ones on UW haul
and the degree of volatility on the same haul drops when the expiry date is further,
which is also in line with the outcomes of hedging performance. The only oddness
lies in the BFA2 series. Several data in the BFA2 series has sudden growth or decline.
Since the BFA2 series are the calculation results based on 3 real prices series, a few
irregular changes are acceptable.
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Figure 30-Change Rate of EU Forward Prices
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Figure 31-Change rate of UW Forward Prices
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Figure 32-Change Rate of BFABDI
Source: Own calculation based on date from Baltic Website

Table 5-Features of EU, UW and BFA series

C.V

C.V

C.V

EU0

EU1

EU2

0.385122

0.365149

0.351553

UW0

UW1

UW2

0.206555

0.190519

0.177271

BFA0

BFA1

BFA2

0.33113

0.262315

0.320021

Besides, EU-S experiences several huge jumps during the whole period, while BDI
faces equally big rises and falls. The frequent varying nature of EU-S is probably the
reason why the hedging performance changes a lot when the calculating model
changes.
As we all know, preeminent hedging performance requires a certain degree of
volatility, which UW-S lacks. Although UW-S changes more frequently than EU-S
and BDI do, those changes are too minor.
The stated reasons can also be applied for the observed 26 products in the SSEFC
market. The prices of each EU forward product are obviously more dynamic than UW
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forward ones judging from the coefficient of variation. The average C.V of EU
products is near 3 times bigger than the one of UW, while the average hedging
efficiency of EU is also about triple the average outcomes of UW products. Change
rate
Activeness and liquidity are required to achieve to a good hedge performance.
However, it does not mean irregular and abrupt changes are preferred. Whenever the
basis is distinct from close products, the hedging efficiency goes down. For instance,
from UW 1204 to UW 1207 the bases have been wandering around 310. However,
UW 1208, 1209 and 1210 go for different ways. Consequently, UW1209 and 1210
have extremely small hedging performance while UW1208 fail to fulfill the job being
a hedging device. The same thing also happened to the EU1208, 1209 and 1210 since
the bases of them are so differ from the previous products (EU1204 to 1207).

Table 6-Features of EU and UW Products
Average Absolute Basis

C.V

EU

EU Forward

UW

UW Forward

1112

69.462

121.500

0.213

0.090

1201

92.167

159.333

0.113

0.030

1202

97.080

149.960

0.111

0.038

1203

130.960

184.800

0.380

0.091

1204

180.731

314.615

0.453

0.195

1205

178.962

312.423

0.413

0.195

1206

177.731

307.962

0.293

0.151

1207

164.769

310.769

0.190

0.096

1208

125.185

344.519

0.111

0.093

1209

108.808

255.462

0.166

0.085

1210

136.280

194.240

0.171

0.057

1211

154.692

208.346

0.147

0.042

1212

160.920

245.000

0.108

0.025
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(2).From the correlation of series
①. In all series, the bases get larger when the forward last longer. Meanwhile the
correlation coefficients descend. They both explain why the hedging performance
decreases along the forward’s duration. The bases of EU series are much smaller than
UW bases. A bigger basis or smaller correlation coefficient means that it is more
difficult to match the forward prices to the spot prices. In other words, the hedging
efficiency is also low.
②. Although correlation coefficients of UW and EU series are series are very high,
the correlation coefficients of the first-difference of the LNEU and LNUW series are
relatively inferior. With the help of the table below, a straight forwarding comparison
can be found. DLNUW series have the lowest coefficient values, which is one of the
reasons why UW routes have the poorest hedging efficiency.

Table 7-Correlation Coefficient of First different series of EU-S, UW-S and BDI
Correlation

DLN(EU-S)

DLN(UW-S)

DLN(BDI)

Coefficient
DLN(EU-S) 1

DLN(UW-S) 1

DLN(BDI)

1

DLN(EU0)

0.579

DLN(UW0)

0.254

DLN(BFA0) 0.567

DLN(EU1)

0.392

DLN(UW1)

0.111

DLN(BFA1) 0.530

DLN(EU2)

0.348

DLN(UW2)

0.135

DLN(BFA2) 0.321

③.As the casualty test showed in chapter 5.1.4.3, the test outcomes of EU series
are better than UW ones, which is the same as the outcomes of hedging performance.
It seems like the casualty test are telling the same story the correlation coefficients do.
Apart from the above reasons, there is one more factor may bring about such
hedging outcomes. Since the SSEFC container forward contracts are newly born,
there is limited numbers of data can be used to run the analysis models. Therefore,
any tiny variation of the data can result in a huge difference in the outcomes.
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5.2.2. Physical market features

How features of the series reflect in the hedging outcomes has been discussed in the
previous section. In this section, reasons why those series behave in such ways are
going to be dug form the aspect of supply and demand pattern.
For the past a couple of years, both container and dry bulk shipping market players
have been suffering due to the depression. Also, in the previous chapters, we can find
that the prevailing freight market is going through the downturn with low volatility.
Generally speaking, under such depression, even huge ascent of demand cannot
generate prominent recovery of freight rates owing to the week volatility.9 And the
weak market is the fruit of the imbalance of demand and supply. There has always
been a race between supply and demand in the shipping market. Anyhow, in the past 5
years, the world fleet has greeted a flourishing age. The growth rate of world fleet has
far overpassed the growth rate of the seaborne trade, which gives rise to the issue of
overcapacity. For years, the supply side finally won the race but at cost of losing
profits.

20.00%

Growth Rate of Demand and Supply in Dry Bulk
Shipping Market

15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00%
-10.00%
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World Fleet

World Seaborne Trade

Figure 33-Growth Rate of Demand and Supply in Dry Bulk Shipping Market
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson Database

When comparing Figure 14 with Figure 33, very similar trends can be found,

9.

Manolis, G. Kavussanos, Ilias, D. Visvikis. (2006). Derivatives and Risk Management in Shipping.
Witherby Seamanship International.
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especially, in the demand side. However, the race taking place in container shipping
market is fiercer. The increase rate of the trade volume of containerized cargo for the
past 12 years is 8.44%, while the one of bulk cargo is 4.87%. And the average growth
rate of container fleet is 9.29%, while the one of bulk fleet is 6.79%.What’s more, the
container fleet growth rate reach its peak relatively earlier than dry bulk fleet does,
which in 2007 at the rate of 14.95%. Dry bulk fleet jumps for its tip point of 16.92%
in 2011. That is to say, during the observation period, the dry bulk shipping market
has just welcomed a bunch of new building ships and those container vessels born in
2007 has been well-adapted. That explains why the SCFI goes through a rising trend
when the BDI experience a declining one. Therefore, the degree of the oversupply is
apparently one of the strongest factors that result in such fluctuation pattern in both
freight markets. Additionally, though the grow rate of container fleet seems to be
slowdown in the past 2 years, its new-building orderbook is actually full. Most world
famous liner shipping companies have placed orders for over 10 vessels last year. For
instance, Maersk put down the deal of 41 ships and both APL and Evergreen are
looking forward to their new 30 giants. Others like COSOCO, China Shipping and
OOCL also ordered 28, 18 and 15 vessels respectively. As we all know that container
ships normally have longer lifespan than bulk vessels and the chances that they caught
damages are relatively smaller because of their standardized handling pattern and
device. Therefore, the oversupply issue in container shipping market can also be
severe even if the ship numbers are less than bulk ones.
Furthermore, the freight market has dissimilar nature for container shipping and dry
bulk shipping. One is liner and weekly calls are promised on both EU and UW routes,
while the other is mainly negotiated in time-charter terms and a vessel will be hired
for months. The choices faced by containerized cargo owners to avoid risks are much
more than cargo owners in the other market and the risks themselves are also lower in
container shipping market. Their exposure to the freight market risk is small and the
amount of money they may loss is also less. Once they pay the price of the boxes they
asked to be on board, their freight rate risk is gone. They usually don’t have to start to
worry about how the freight will go month early and most of containerized cargo
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owners may even pay zero attention to the freight market since the real profitable
margin lies in the goods while the freights are only a tiny portion of the cost.
Consequently, they have no needs to secure their position in the containerized freight
market.
It is well-known that dry bulk is more inexpensive and has a greater amount than
container cargoes. The freights take up a great portion of costs for cargo owners.
Therefore, their desire of hedging the freight risk is much higher than the ones in
container shipping market. However, the difference within containerized trade is not
that obvious. So the trading pattern and the deployed capacity on the two different
routes are analyzed.
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Figure 34-Seaborne Containerized Trade on Specific Route (000TEU)
Source: Clarkson SIN
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Figure 35-Contianerized Carrying Capacity on Specific Route (000TEU)
Source: Clarkson SIN
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Figure 36-Capacity Utilization on Specific Route
Source: Own calculation based on Clarkson SIN

(1).The trading pattern of EU and North America route.
Generally speaking, the North America haul is busier than the Europe one. The
average seaborne containerized trade on Far East – Europe, Europe - Far East, Far
East - North America and North America - Far East trip for the past 10 years are
10,826,636TEU, 4,812,273TEU, 12,379,364TEU and 6,176,727TEU respectively. On
both directions, there are more goods being transported on the North America lane.
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Nevertheless, since the financial crisis took place in the USA, there have been less
cargoes heading for North America than for Europe from the Far East. In 2011 and
2012, the trading volumes of Far East – Europe service are 14,191,000TEU and
13,631,000TEU, while the ones of Far East - North America service are
13,135,000TEU and 13,162,000TEU. It seems like that the North America market has
a bit more difficulty in recovering than Europe market. What’s more, both lanes are
heavily imbalanced. Only the trading imbalance on Europe haul is more severe. As
can be clearly seen from the figure, ever since 2007 when the westbound trips of
Europe route experienced a sharp rise, the performance of trading balance on Europe
lane is surpassed by the one on North America lane. By the end of 2012, the ratios of
outbound cargo over inbound cargo of the Far East are 2.08 (Europe route) and 1.74
(North America route) individually. As shipping lines, it is normal to offer a relatively
more flexible freight rate on the imbalance trading lane, since they want to secure
their profit in advance. There is a greater possibility that the ships are not full on
Europe-Far East lane. Hence, the liner companies will seize any opportunities to raise
their rates. But they cannot do that to all customers, owing to that not every one of
them is that easy to be taken advantages of. Some customers are “big faces” who they
cannot mess with and others may have huge amount of cargoes who shipping lines
may want to establish long-term relationships with. With the struggle inside the mind
of shipping companies, the freight rates they provide reflects that opposite feelings by
being very active.
Ever since 2007, the Europe haul is better equipped than the North America haul.
Due to the facts that not only the trading TEU on Far East – Europe trip exceed the
ones on Far East - North America trip, but also the gigantism of the vessels. Liner
companies have realized the merits of applying huger vessel to longer haul. The saved
unit cost is supposed to bring about higher profit margin. The deployment of fleets on
both routes is very similar for the past 6 years. And the carrying capacity of Far East Europe trip is 1.11 times larger than Europe - Far East trip, which is same as the Far
East - North America to North America - Far East trip. The ratio of trading volumes
on both directions is different for Europe and North America lanes, while the ratio of
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carrying capacity on both directions is almost same for the two. Consequently, the
usage of the capacity is apparently distinct. Despite the factor that the North America
lanes have better performance on both directions, the outbound trip of the Far East has
the opposite outcomes to the inbound trip. The Far East - North America lag has
always been outperforming the Far East – Europe one for the past 10 years. Just the
difference is dropping and for the past 5 years there has only been about 3% usage
difference between them. On contrast, the gap between North America - Far East and
Europe - Far East is extending during the last 10 years and has reached over 12% in
2011. It seems like the real competition for shipping lines lies in the backhaul to the
Far East. Whoever collect more sufficient cargoes is the real winner in the market.

(2).The trading value of EU and North America route.
In the year of 2012, outbound cargoes’ values destining America were about 117.16
billion USD, while the cargoes heading for European Union were worth 106.87billion
USD. On the hand, the value of cargoes imported from North America was much
lower than those from EU, only 32.18 billion USD. The EU trip was obviously more
balanced. During the observation period, the average outbound and inbound value
proportion on the North America haul were 78.45% and 21.55% respectively, on the
contrary, the ones on the EU route were 58.02% and 41.98% individually.
Besides, the cargo value exporting to North America had always been below to the
one heading for Europe. However, recently, the value of North America route seems
to be going through a rising trend while the value of EU route is declining. In other
words, the physical market on EU trip is more uncertain and has more risks than the
one on North America trip, which including the UW route. Such uncertainty and risks
force both the physical and paper market of containerized freight on EU route to
become more dynamic with wider change ranges.
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Figure 39-Export value of Shanghai Port on EU and UW Routes
Source: Own calculation based on data from Shanghai Customs Website
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Figure 40-Import Value of Shanghai Port on EU and UW Routes
Source: Own calculation based on data from Shanghai Customs Website

(3).The fleet deployment on EU and North America routes
Table 8-The fleet deployment on EU and North America Routes in 2012
Europe-Far
East
Vessel number 349
TEU
2,774,807
Average TEU 7951
per ship

Far East-North America
474
2,508,139
5291

Far East-North America
West Coast
291
1,622,901
5577

Source: Own calculation based on CI-Online

Roughly speaking, EU route is better equipped and such situation is supposed to be
continued, since the EU haul is much longer and the total trading cargo value on this
route is also higher than the UW one. Any rational ship operators will arrange fancier
fleets for EU trips where economic scale is expected to be achieved. With the unit cost
is compressed, the profit margin of EU trip service is supposed to be bigger than UW
service. Hence, the freight rates on EU haul is more dynamic since the shipping lines
have more rooms for negotiation.
The freight rate to some extent rely on how worthy are the cargoes inside the
container. For example, when a shipper wants to have some low-value but huge
volume commodities carried such as clothing or rubber, which the shipping company
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he or she will choose is largely decided by how much the company charges. Therefore,
shipping liners may have an intense price competition to win over the customer. If it is
a widespread situation on the EU trip, strong volatility will be created in the freight
market. On the contrary, shippers with high-value goods like those on the North
America route will pay less attention on the freight. Instead, service level and
reliability of the shipping company will be on the top of the list.

5.2.3. Degree of uncertainty, risk difference and dissimilar market players

We all know that the container shipping market is not a perfect competition one. It
is far less free and flexible than bulk market. The entrance and exit barriers for
carriers in container shipping market are very high. A mature and successful container
carriage service requires larger and more stabilized fleets to provide promised calls at
agreed ports. Other vertical integrated services are also demanded in the industry,
such as logistic service and inland transportation service. Shipping lines cannot just
bail out whenever the freight rate fail to meet their expectation or the market is down.
On contrast, shipowners can break their promises whenever they want in the dry bulk
shipping market since they are only bound by charter parties. The contracts can be
easily breached as long as the penal sum is paid. In a word, though the liner
companies are more dominant and have more power in deciding price, the risks and
costs they bear are also larger. Especially when the market is down, they have a whole
chain of companies they need to feed and support. Likewise, the shippers in container
shipping market face more options and are less tied to the freight rates at the expense
of taking a less powerful position in the market. There are so many shipping
companies providing weekly call services. Even when shippers fail to get their cargos
aboard this week, they can still find a spot in a vessel next week.
Generally speaking, it takes about 23 to 25 days from Shanghai port to main ports
of Europe such as Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp. On the other hand, trips to
North America West Coast vary from ports to ports. For example, it costs 12 days to
arrive at Los Angeles and 20 days will be spent to reach Oakland. Additionally, there
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exists a Suez Canal on the EU-Far East haul which ascends the uncertainty and risk
level of this trip, since the possibility of temporary closure of the canal is not zero and
that area were known for piracy. On contrast, the UW trip was only an open sea, so
the participants on that haul are less worried about the carriage. Consequently, the
forward market on UW haul is less active and may even be short of liquidity.
Furthermore, the player numbers in SSEFC container forward market is far less
than those in FFA market. And they are less armed with adequate knowledge, less
familiar with forward market and less motivated, which in return, may create false
market trends in the paper market. In container shipping market, the carrier and
shipper are usually unequally strong. Due to the market nature, shipping companies
more have a say in deciding the freight rates. And most of them show little interests in
the SSEFC container forward market because not only they can secure their position
and shift their risk by have a long-term contract with cargo owners but also they do
not want to hand over the power of pricing, which makes it more difficult for cargo
owners to find counterparties in the paper market.
On the other hand, the motivation behind cargo owners is also low. Cargo owner
with large good flows can easily gain discounts from shipping lines. If the goods are
also valuable, they will pay even less attention on the freight market since it does
slight harm to their profit margin.
The current players inside the SSEFC container forward market are persons who
looking for speculation not for hedging. Most of them are neither carriers nor
shippers.
The trading volumes in the SSEFC container freight forward market are still
relatively low and there is a clear cyclicity. Those products which end at the beginning
of a quarter have an outstanding liquidity. The remaining products on both routes face
extremely low trading volumes and the gap between liquid ones and illiquid ones is
also huge. Furthermore, days when volumes are below 20 take up a great part of the
total, which means that for most products, there is only a tiny amount of contracts
being traded during most Fridays.
Besides, the total volumes of contracts as well as the volumes of most products (11
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out of 13) on EU routes are larger than the ones on UW routes, which means more
people prefer to getting involved on the EU service. Therefore, the forward market of
EU trips is more dynamic and is able to reflect more real market expectation. More
Fresh information is poured into the paper market more quickly and market is getting
more efficient than the one of UW service. Consequently, the hedging performance is
better.

Table 9-Volumes of EU and UW Products
Volumes on Fridays

Percentages of days when volumes
are below 20

Products

EU

UW

EU

UW

1112

869

666

26.92%

46.15%

1201

572272

506590

8.33%

12.50%

1202

3449

549

48.00%

60.00%

1203

1099

463

52.00%

68.00%

1204

593106

552805

3.85%

3.85%

1205

443

379

69.23%

73.08%

1206

496

486

69.23%

73.08%

1207

140514

128348

7.69%

7.69%

1208

867

534

62.96%

55.56%

1209

404

625

69.23%

69.23%

1210

71951

60480

8.00%

8.00%

1211

411

388

84.62%

84.62%

1212

610

642

72.00%

72.00%

Total

1386491

1252955

Source: Own calculation based on data from SSEFC application
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5.3. Existing problems and prospective developing SSEFC container
forward contracts

5.3.1. Problems of SCFI

Since the SCFI are created by the quoting prices from shipping lines and cargo
owners who have totally opposite interest in the freight market, the index may not as
objective as BDI. Shipping lines will give a higher-than-real freight rate trying to
level up the future freights, while the cargo owners will want to depress the freight
rates by presenting a low one. What’s more, it also hurt the authority of the SCFI and
the attractiveness of the SSEFC container forward contracts.
A daily published SCFI and specific spot rates on each route is desired in the future
and the degree of the accuracy of the index and freight rates are also eager to be
improved, for say, to be accurate to 0.1, because of the low volatility of the
comprehensive and several service routes.

5.3.2. Problems of the SSEFC container forward market

The SSEFC container forward market of EU and UW routes is not efficient and is
full of uncertainty and risk.10The information has not been flow into paper market
instantly as it is supposed to be. There is a high possibility the prices in the paper
market are not telling what the real expectation of the market. Sustaining
improvements and adjustments are probably needed to conquer such problem in
future developments. Proper publicity can be a helper to stimulate the market liquidity
to some extent. Time is an important element in the development. Time is required to
be spent, on which people will get SSEFC container forward market and let the
market grow.

10. Wang Ying. (2012). Analysis of the efficiency of Shanghai containerized freight futures market.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
OLS and GARCH models are used in this thesis to analyze the constant and
time-varying optimal hedge ratio of the SSEFC container forward contracts on EU
and UW routes. The outcomes of BFABDI are used as assessment criterion to see to
what extent the containerized freight forward falls behind. The hedging efficiency is
calculated in the terms of the percentage of reduced variance. Sample data are the
collection of closing spot and forward prices on every Friday and the observation
period lasts for one and half years. The hedging performance of 26 products in
SSEFC container forward market is also analyzed.
After the results are gained, analyses on the factors behind such difference of
results are also carried out.

6.1. Achievement of this thesis

(1).Containerized freight series are a bit less volatile than dry bulk freight series.
Between EU and UW series, both spot and forward prices on EU routes are more
dynamic than the ones on the UW route. Average volatility rate of spot freight rates on
EU route was even double of the ones on UW.
(2). EU0, EU1 and EU2 share more similar trend with EU-S than UW0, UW1 and
UW2 do with UW-S. Correlation coefficients between EU products and EU-S are all
over 0.9. On the other hand, only the correlation coefficient between UW-S and UW0
is very close to 1. Besides, the long the forward last the lower the correlation
coefficient it can have with the corresponding index.
(3).BFABDI series have the best hedging performance as a whole and containerized
freight forward of EU trips are next. UW series suffer the most pitiful performance.
Outcomes of EU series are relatively more approximate to BFA ones. Especially the
hedging performance of EU0 is almost the same as the one of BFA0 in OLS model.
Furthermore, EU0, UW0 and BFA0 have the best hedging performance in both
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models.
(4). Both UW series and BFA series have very similar outcomes in OLS and
GARCH models, whereas the EU series experience huge difference in 2 models.
Optimal hedge ratios of EU0 and EU1 collapse a lot when model is changes, while the
hedging efficiency remains almost the same.
(5).The hedging performance of 26 actual SSEFC container forward products on
EU and UW routes is also discussed. The EU ones have apparent better efficiency.
(6).Volatility and change patterns of spot and forward prices, distribution of the
return-rate series and correlation coefficients are probably the direct reasons why
outcomes are like what is stated above. Supply and demand in physical market, trade
pattern and different cargo values on different routes are the causes of the features of
the freight rate series. What’s more, the degree of uncertainty and risk on each route
has strong impact on the participants’ attitudes and expectations towards the
containerized freight forward market. Besides, the unwillingness of entering the
forward market of those big shipping lines also restrain the trading and development
of SSEFC container forward contracts.

6.2. The deficiencies of this thesis

(1).The analysis scope is largely restricted by the numbers of sample data. Since the
SSEFC container forward contracts have only been launched for less than 2 year, the
data availability is really low. Further discussion with longer observation period can
be carried out when the times go by.
(2).More detailed models are preferred to calculating the optimal hedge ratio and
hedging efficiency. Besides, mathematical models can also be applied to exploring the
driver factor behind the hedging outcomes.
(3).Since the observation period is right after the financial crisis and during such
period, the container shipping market is misted by so many uncertainties and
overcapacity issue, the sample data may behave in a too particularity way which to
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some extent could lead to a distorted outcomes are.
(4). A few reasons of the features of outcomes fail to be thoroughly discussed due
the lack of data. What’s more, practical issues including policy, politics and other
potential factors which could influence the research haven’t been taking into
consideration.
(5).Other related issues can studied in the futures, such as means to promote the
SSEFC container forward market, how to level up the hedging efficiency and how is
the other functional performance of the SSEFC container forward contracts, like
price-leading or speculating.
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Appendix I-Main features of EU and UW series
EU-S

EU0

EU1

EU2

Mean

1147.70

1175.51

1207.88

1182.80

Median

1135.50

1163.50

1225.50

1111.00

Maximum

1934.00

2010.00

2069.00

2040.00

Minimum

490.00

521.00

534.00

636.00

Std.Dev.

439.53

452.74

441.06

415.00

Skewness

0.18

0.27

0.28

0.49

Kurtosis

1.64

1.75

1.85

2.06

Jarque-Bera

6.25

5.86

5.19

5.80

Probability

0.04

0.05

0.07

0.05

Sample

76

76

76

76

LN(EU-S)

LN(EU0)

LN(EU1)

LN(EU2)

Mean

6.97

6.99

7.03

7.01

Median

7.03

7.06

7.11

7.01

Maximum

7.57

7.61

7.63

7.62

Minimum

6.19

6.26

6.28

6.46

Std.Dev.

0.41

0.40

0.38

0.35

Skewness

-0.21

-0.15

-0.14

0.06

Kurtosis

1.78

1.79

1.79

1.82

Jarque-Bera

5.33

4.96

4.90

4.45

Probability

0.07

0.84

0.09

0.11

Sample

76

76

76

76

UW-S

UW0

UW1

UW2

Mean

2045.65

2078.74

2146.09

2122.84

Median

2024.50

2135.50

2320.00

2200.00

76

Maximum

2782.00

2780.00

2858.00

3100.00

Minimum

1418.00

1440.00

1506.00

1542.00

Std.Dev.

436.48

429.37

408.87

376.50

Skewness

0.11

-0.02

-0.10

0.20

Kurtosis

1.58

1.58

1.53

2.10

Jarque-Bera

6.55

6.37

6.96

3.05

Probability

0.04

0.04

0.03

0.22

Sample

76

76

76

76

LN(UW-S)

LN(UW0)

LN(UW1)

LN(UW2)

Mean

7.60

7.62

7.65

7.64

Median

7.61

7.67

7.75

7.70

Maximum

7.93

7.93

7.96

8.04

Minimum

7.26

7.27

7.32

7.34

Std.Dev.

0.22

0.21

0.20

0.18

Skewness

-0.07

-0.20

-0.24

-0.05

Kurtosis

1.58

1.59

1.53

1.84

Jarque-Bera

6.50

6.77

7.59

4.27

Probability

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.12

Sample

76

76

76

76
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Appendix-II Features of series
1. Features of Rate of Return of Europe route series.

78

2.

Features of Rate of Return of UW route series.
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Appendix-III ADF test, Johansen Cointegration test and Granger
Causality Test
LN(EU-S)

LN(EU0)

LN(EU1)

LN(EU2)

ADF

t-Statistic

-1.119230

-1.103593

-1.000743

-1.359772

test

Probability

0.704300

0.710600

0.750300

0.597400

Test

1% level

-3.520307

-3.520307

-3.520307

-3.520307

critical

5% level

-2.900670

-2.900670

-2.900670

-2.900670

values

10% level

-2.587691

-2.587691

-2.587691

-2.587691

LN(UW-S)

LN(UW0)

LN(UW1)

LN(UW2)

statistic

ADF

t-Statistic

-1.383108

-1.428317

-1.416476

-1.690436

test

Probability

0.586100

0.560100

0.565600

0.431900

Test

1% level

-3.520307

-3.520307

-3.520307

-3.520307

critical

5% level

-2.900670

-2.900670

-2.900670

-2.900670

values

10% level

-2.587691

-2.587691

-2.587691

-2.587691

LN(BDI)

LN(BFA0)

LN(BFA1)

LN(BFA2)

statistic

ADF

t-Statistic

-1.990705

-1.031818

-0.959232

-1.739599

test

Probability

0.290300

0.738200

0.763800

0.407500

Test

1% level

-3.519050

-3.517847

-3.517847

-3.517847

critical

5% level

-2.900137

-2.899190

-2.899190

-2.899190

values

10% level

-2.587409

-2.587134

-2.587134

-2.587134

DLN(EU-S)

DLN(EU0)

DLN(EU1)

DLN(EU2)

-6.863573

-7.826163

-6.769347

-5.483251

statistic

ADF

t-Statistic
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test

Probability

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

Test

1% level

-3.521579

-3.521579

-3.521579

-3.521579

critical

5% level

-2.901217

-2.901217

-2.901217

-2.901217

values

10% level

-2.587981

-2.587981

-2.587981

-2.587981

statistic

DLN(UW-S) DLN(UW0) DLN(UW1) DLN(UW2)
ADF

t-Statistic

-6.289995

-8.612817

-9.894127

-9.752000

test

Probability

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

Test

1% level

-3.521579

-3.521579

-3.521579

-3.521579

critical

5% level

-2.901217

-2.901217

-2.901217

-2.901217

values

10% level

-2.587981

-2.587981

-2.587981

-2.587981

statistic

DLN(BDI)

DLN(BFA0) DLN(BFA1) DLN(BFA2)

ADF

t-Statistic

-4.600925

-7.129084

-8.085397

-7.349175

test

Probability

0.000300

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

Test

1% level

-3.519050

-3.519050

-3.519050

-3.519050

critical

5% level

-2.900137

-2.900137

-2.900137

-2.900137

values

10% level

-2.587409

-2.587409

-2.587409

-2.587409

statistic

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)

LN(EU-S)

LN(EU-S)

LN(EU-S)

&LN(EU0)

&LN(EU1)

&LN(EU2)

24.23946

32.05243

20.38281

0.0019

0.0001

0.0084

0.05 Critical Value

15.49471

15.49471

15.49471

Trace Statistic

2.01739

2.370136

3.026699

Probability

0.1555

0.1237

0.0819

Trace Statistic
None Probability

At
most
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1

0.05 Critical Value

3.841466

3.841466

3.841466

LN(UW-S)

LN(UW-S)

LN(UW-S)

&LN(UW0)

&LN(UW1)

&LN(UW2)

12.86327

15.71676

14.58955

0.1199

0.0653

0.0681

0.05 Critical Value

15.49471

15.49471

15.49471

Trace Statistic

1.520115

1.80267

1.435892

most

Probability

0.2176

0.1794

0.2308

1

0.05 Critical Value

3.841466

3.841466

3.841466

LN(BDI)

LN(BDI)

LN(BDI)

&LN(BFA0)

&LN(BFA1)

&LN(BFA2)

24.12416

32.05243

20.46634

0.002

0.0001

0.0082

0.05 Critical Value

15.49471

15.49471

15.49471

Trace Statistic

2.012252

2.370136

3.031164

most

Probability

0.156

0.1237

0.0817

1

0.05 Critical Value

3.841466

3.841466

3.841466

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)

Trace Statistic
None Probability

At

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)

Trace Statistic
None Probability

At

Null Hypothesis

F-Statistic

Probability

LN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause LN(EU0)

13.7214

1.00E-05

LN(EU0)does not Granger Cause LN(EU-S)

6.00563

0.0039

LN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause LN(EU1)

1.72014

0.1866

LN(EU1)does not Granger Cause LN(EU-S)

16.0557

2.00E-06

LN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause LN(EU2)

2.45409

0.0934

LN(EU2)does not Granger Cause LN(EU-S)

10.2777

0.0001

DLN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU0)

15.1001

4.00E-06

DLN(EU0)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU-S)

0.04712

0.954
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DLN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU1)

1.42215

0.2483

DLN(EU1)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU-S)

2.61064

0.0808

DLN(EU-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU2)

2.48548

0.0908

DLN(EU2)does not Granger Cause DLN(EU-S)

3.36346

0.0405

Null Hypothesis

F-Statistic

Probability

LN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause LN(UW0)

6.29501

3.10E-03

LN(UW0)does not Granger Cause LN(UW-S)

4.60357

0.0133

LN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause LN(UW1)

0.47199

0.6258

LN(UW1)does not Granger Cause LN(UW-S)

5.10858

8.50E-03

LN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause LN(UW2)

0.35594

0.7018

LN(UW2)does not Granger Cause LN(UW-S)

3.4847

0.0362

DLN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW0)

4.46234

1.51E-02

DLN(UW0)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW-S)

3.42446

0.0383

DLN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW1)

0.65085

0.5248

DLN(UW1)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW-S)

0.39223

0.6771

DLN(UW-S)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW2)

0.4849

0.6179

DLN(UW2)does not Granger Cause DLN(UW-S)

0.96232

0.3871

Null Hypothesis

F-Statistic

Probability

LN(BDI)does not Granger Cause LN(BFA0)

13.6991

1.00E-05

LN(BFA0)does not Granger Cause LN(BDI)

5.92934

0.0042

LN(BDI)does not Granger Cause LN(BFA1)

1.72014

0.1866

LN(BFA1)does not Granger Cause LN(BDI)

16.0557

2.00E-06

LN(BDI)does not Granger Cause LN(BFA2)

2.44759

0.094

LN(BFA2)does not Granger Cause LN(BDI)

10.3317

0.0001

DLN(BDI)does not Granger Cause DLN(BFA0)

9.00315

3.00E-04

DLN(BFA0)does not Granger Cause DLN(BDI)

0.13417

0.8747

DLN(BDI)does not Granger Cause DLN(BFA1)

0.83266

0.4392
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DLN(BFA1)does not Granger Cause DLN(BDI)

2.63987

0.0785

DLN(BDI)does not Granger Cause DLN(BFA2)

2.25557

0.1124

DLN(BFA2)does not Granger Cause DLN(BDI)

2.5947

0.0818
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Appendix-IV Hedging Outcomes of OLS and GARCH model
1. Results of OLS model
(1).Results of Europe route
DLN(EU-S)

DLN(EU0)

DLN(EU1)

DLN(EU2)

0.010007

0.009487

0.005912

0.00464

COV

0.005571

0.002973

0.00234

h(OLS)

0.596378

0.51197

0.51385

He(OLS)

0.326795

0.149348

0.11818

R^2(OLS)

0.335

0.152661

0.11988

VAR

(2).Results of West coast of the United Stated route
DLN(UW-S)

DLN(UW0)

DLN(UW1)

DLN(UW2)

0.002128

0.003829123

0.002846

0.003448

COV

0.000627279

0.000327

0.000305

h(OLS)

0.169636

0.122211

0.09363

He(OLS)

0.047869636

0.017564

0.012664

R^2(OLS)

0.044556

0.012678

0.006799

DLN(BDI)

DLN(BFA0)

DLN(BFA1)

DLN(BFA2)

0.0077231

0.0094135

0.0075183

0.0180979

COV

0.0047748

0.0039886

0.0037429

h(OLS)

0.5183180

0.5427240

0.2123120

He(OLS)

0.3134465

0.2738386

0.1001589

R^2(OLS)

0.3189430

0.2778380

0.0947050

VAR

(3).Results of BFA

VAR

86

2. Results of GARCH mode
(1).Results of Europe route
DLN(EU-S)

DLN(EU0)

DLN(EU1)

DLN(EU2)

0.01000716

0.009487

0.005912

0.0046428

COV

0.005571

0.002973

0.0023436

h(GARCH)

0.340368

0.239368

0.583534

He(GARCH)

0.269115

0.108377

0.1153448

R^2(GARCH)

0.272751

0.108586

0.117623

VAR

(2). Results of West coast of the United Stated route
DLN(UW-S) DLN(UW0)

DLN(UW1)

DLN(UW2)

0.002128

0.003829

0.002846

0.003448

COV

0.000627

0.000327

0.000305

h(GARCH)

0.179039

0.116676

0.045723

He(GARCH)

0.04787

0.017633

0.009734

R^2(GARCH)

0.044397

0.012637

0.003065

VAR

(3).Results of BFA
DLN(BDI)

DLN(BFA0)

DLN(BFA1)

DLN(BFA2)

0.0077231

0.0094135

0.0075183

0.0180979

COV

0.0047748

0.0039886

0.0037429

h(GARCH)

0.5432990

0.6201390

0.3006240

He(GARCH)

0.3120106

0.2661644

0.0796077

R^2(GARCH)

0.3181760

0.2719580

0.0763880

VAR
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